standing of the current situation requires a contextual setting, both historical and institutional. The history of U.S. engagement with procedural problems in international civil litigation is short. Not so the list of institutional actors empowered to make or apply procedural law for international civil litigation in the courts of this country. Indeed, the shortness of the history is related to the length of the list of relevant institutional actors. For years, the supposed requirements of U.S. federalism hindered international lawmaking through private international law treaties 7 as effectively as they did a federal law of procedure for federal courts.' Although the latter situation changed in the 1930s, 9 federalism objections die hard in the international arena.
The states of the United States and their constituent lawmaking institutions remain important actors in international civil litigation in this country. Nonetheless, I leave them largely out of this article. In part, that is a concession to the shortness of life. In addition, this article is about international cooperation and the lawmaking institutions most appropriately involved in its pursuit (or in decisions not to cooperate). The states are powerless to reach international agreements, 0 and, in areas of federal lawmaking competence, they make law only by federal sufferance. There is federal lawmaking competence on the major procedural issues in international civil litigation, but sufferance may be an appropriate posture." A decision between state and federal law is appropriately made, however, only after considering the full array of lawmaking techniques. That array is available only at the federal level.
Although my focus is on procedural law and lawmaking for international civil litigation in U.S. courts, it is also important to consider the arrangements we have made, or might in the future make, in aid of litigation abroad. Our record in providing judicial assistance is enviable, but it is a record that continues to haunt us, encouraging Americans to think that no good deed goes unpunished and foreigners to think that, in law as in life, there is no free lunch. 2 Putting state lawmaking institutions to the side, I am concerned with the history and potential of procedural lawmaking for international civil litigation by means of federal legislation, federal court rulemaking, federal judge-made law, and treaties. After describing and analyzing the previous involvement of these various forms of federal lawmaking in Part II of this article," I turn in Part III to common threads that run through our lawmaking efforts. 4 Chief among those threads are unilateralism, a preference for national over international uniformity, impatience, and penuriousness.
These related approaches and attitudes have in the past prevented or hindered the process of dialogue and mutual education necessary for international cooperation. I argue that unilateralism deserves to be buried, not reborn, that international uniformity is increasingly more important than national uniformity, and that both international education and education about international and comparative law require more patience and more public resources than we have previously been willing to commit. These conclusions have implications that I explore in Part IV with reference to both domestic and international lawmaking structures and techniques." 5 
II LAWMAKING APPROACHES AND INSTITUTIONS IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
A. Congressional Legislation
Procedural Legislation in General.
Congress has only rarely prescribed the procedural rules to be applied in federal or state courts, including the rules applicable to international civil litigation. Rather, in the case of federal courts, Congress has usually chosen to proceed by delegation, de jure or de facto, and it has rarely disturbed the procedures employed in state courts even in connection with federal statutory rights.
Congress's de jure delegations have come in a series of statutes, dating to the beginning of the Republic, 6 empowering the federal courts to make local rules of procedure and empowering the Supreme Court to prescribe supervisory or national rules for the lower federal courts. 17 Its de facto delegations came in a series of statutes (process acts) requiring the federal courts to follow state procedure in civil actions at law. 8 The two species of delegated power coexisted, at times uneasily, until the Conformity Act of 1872,'9 in which Congress strengthened the federal courts' obligation to follow state procedural 13 18. See id. at 755-59; Burbank, supra note 8, at 1036-39. Equity had remained free of any requirement of conformity since the beginning of the Republic; it had been governed by court rules promulgated by the Supreme Court since 1822, and it was preserved against the depredations of code merger (via court rule) by Supreme Court interpretation.
Id. at 1039 (footnotes omitted).
19. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § § 5-6, 17 Stat. 196, 197. law, preferring dynamic conformity to state law to the potential mediating power of federal court rules. 2 " A long campaign to reinvigorate the national rulemaking power ensued, culminating in the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 and in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which took effect in 1938.21
Throughout the long period prior to the Federal Rules, Congress occasionally departed from its pattern of delegation by enacting statutory provisions regulating particular aspects of federal court procedure. Indeed, the existence of such federal statutes, rendering complete conformity to state law impossible, furnished an arrow in the quiver of those who sought to replace the Conformity Act of 1872 with rulemaking by the Supreme Court. 22 Very few of Congress's efforts, however, were directed at international civil litigation.' In that area, federal legislation tended to be not only episodic, but also reactive. Thus, outrage that prime suspects in the Teapot Dome scandal were hiding from U.S.
justice in Europe prompted legislation to broaden the reach of the subpoena and contempt powers. 24 The Supreme Court subsequently upheld the statutes as implemented,' but some have questioned whether our legal institutions were not more responsive to a domestic political crisis than they were to the requirements of international law.
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In the years after the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective, and until approximately 1975, Congress had additional incentives to stay out of federal court procedure. The desire to rid the books of laws inconsistent with the Federal Rules, which led to the provision in the 1934 Enabling Act known as the supersession clause, 27 was finally satisfied in the 1948 revision of the Judicial Code. ' Thereafter, such federal statutory provisions on court procedure as did creep into law were few and far between.
Since 1975, when Congress transmuted into statute proposed Rules of Evidence that the Supreme Court had promulgated under the Enabling Act, 29 Congress has become more active in supervising national court rulemaking and 20. See Burbank [Vol. 57: No. 3 in independently framing rules for federal court litigation. 3 " A comprehensive overhaul in 1988 of the statutes empowering the federal courts to make local and national rules 31 was animated in part by the hope that Congress might again assume a passive role. 32 So long, however, as the alleged costs and delays of litigation are an overtly political issue, 33 that seems unlikely, as does the prospect that ambitious politicians will be persuaded to leave all of the reform initiative with the federal rulemakers. 4 
The Commission and Advisory Committee on International Rules of Judicial
Procedure. A major exception to Congress's hands-off attitude towards federal procedural law in the period between 1938 and 1975 occurred precisely in the area of international civil litigation. In 1964, Congress enacted a number of provisions relating to international judicial assistance. 3 5 A closer look at the process by which the 1964 legislation was formulated is important to an understanding of policies and attitudes with respect to, and institutional structures for, lawmaking in international civil litigation.
Following World War II, U.S. lawyers engaged in international transactions became increasingly concerned that adequate mechanisms did not exist for judicial assistance (including service of process, taking evidence abroad, and proof of foreign law) in international civil litigation in our courts. It also became apparent that those involved in litigation abroad had some of the same problems with respect to assistance from the United States. to the conduct and settlement of litigation in State and Federal courts and quasijudicial agencies which involve the performance of acts in foreign territory, such as the. service of judicial documents, the obtaining of evidence, and the proof of foreign law, may be more readily ascertainable, efficient, economical, and expeditious, and that the procedures of our State and Federal tribunals for the rendering of assistance to foreign courts and quasi-judicial agencies be similarly improved, the Commission shall-(a) draft for the assistance of the Secretary of State international agreements to be negotiated by him; (b) draft and recommend to the President any necessary legislation; (c) recommend to the President such other action as may appear advisable to improve and codify international practice in civil, criminal, and administrative proceedings; and (d) perform such other related duties as the President may assign.
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Unfortunately, the Commission and its Advisory Committee labored under serious disabilities from the start. Established in late 1958, they were required to finish their work and submit a final report by the close of 1959. 40 Had that even been possible, Congress failed to appropriate funds in 1958 or the first quarter of 1959,41 although the statute had authorized an appropriation of as much as $75,000.42
The Commission overcame the first problem, securing three successive extensions of its existence, so that it was finally authorized to operate until December 31, 1966.' 3 But it never succeeded in prying from the Treasury the funds necessary for the ambitious work expected of it. Subsisting at first on a $25,000 loan from the President ($9,000 of which could not be used because it was not spent or obligated in 1959)," the Commission received only $60,000 in funds appropriated for its work over its lifetime. 4 5 Even that figure is deceptive, because the last appropriation, $25,000 in legislation effective April 30, 1965, was available only until May 1, 196546 and was intended partially to reimburse Commission staff who had been working without salary, and otherwise expending their own funds, for more than two years. 47 In these circumstances, it should be no surprise that, as Professor Nadelmann critically observed,' the Commission never got around to the primary task set for it in the enabling legislation: "draft [ing] rather that the Commission and Advisory Committee accomplished anything consequential. Indeed, Professor Nadelmann seems to have doubted that those bodies deserved much credit for reforms that issued under their auspices, including the legislation passed by Congress in 1964.50 In 1959, when it was unclear whether the Commission's life would be extended and when it was quite clear that the funds for its work were wholly inadequate, 5 1 the Advisory Committee recommended, and the Commission approved, an initial program giving priority "to projects which will be of most benefit to courts and litigants in this country, and which offer a chance of substantial accomplishment within the period of the statutory life of the Commission," treating projects that would require several years for full treatment "on a 'pilot' basis," and confining "work to projects which will not require international agreements or treaties and the consequent negotiation with foreign governments by the Department of State." 52 Notwithstanding a $25,000 appropriation in 1959," 4 the Commission would have needed private funding for even the scaled-down work program adopted in that year. And that is what, with the President's approval, 5 5 the Commission sought, securing an arrangement with the Carnegie Corporation and Columbia Law School "whereby funds would be made available through a research project of the Columbia Law School to finance the work of the Commission."56 According to that arrangement, Columbia would employ the Commission's Director and staff as consultants, the Columbia Project on International Procedure would "make available to the Commission the fruits of its research and study of existing practices of judicial assistance," and leaders of the Commission (and Advisory Committee) and of the Columbia Project would cooperatively determine "the manner in which research conducted for the benefit of the Commission [would] be undertaken. 57 The fruits of this collaboration included the legislation that is my immediate concern, as well as amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and a The legislation recommended by the Commission and passed by Congress in 1964 dealt with aspects of judicial assistance in aid of both domestic and foreign proceedings. Among its provisions were new sections or amendments to existing law designed to facilitate proof of foreign documents in criminal and civil actions, 62 empowering the State Department to receive and transmit letters rogatory, 63 and empowering district courts to assist in serving documents "in connection with a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal" ' and in securing testimony and documents for use abroad. 65 In language essentially identical to that used by the Commission's chair when transmitting the proposed bill, the Senate Judiciary Committee observed:
Until recently, the United States has not engaged itself fully in efforts to improve practices of international cooperation in litigation. The steadily growing involvement of the United States in international intercourse and the resulting increase in litigation with international aspects have demonstrated the necessity for statutory improvements and other devices to facilitate the conduct of such litigation. Enactment of the bill into law will constitute a major step in bringing the United States to the forefront of nations adjusting their procedures to those of sister nations and thereby providing equitable and efficacious procedures for the benefit of tribunals and litigants involved in litigation with international aspects. It is hoped that the initiative taken by the United States in improving its procedures will invite foreign countries similarly to adjust their procedures. ' In light of Congress's shabby treatment of the Commission, 6 7 it would be a mistake to read too much into the 1964 legislation, let alone to see in that legislation an exception for international cases to Congress's traditional inertia with respect to matters of procedure. ' Yet, notwithstanding Professor Congress played no role in redrafting the statute. Rather, the new draft was written entirely by an advisory committee and adopted summarily. Instead of reviewing the bill for substantive accuracy, Congress merely adopted the drafters' report as legislative history.
Nadelmann's suggestion to the contrary, 69 the legislation recommended by the Commission (as well as the rest of its work) appears to have been the product of a truly collaborative effort among the Commission, its Advisory Committee, and the Columbia Project. 7 " Ironically, in light of the policies animating the Commission's stated program, 7 1 the legislation gave more to foreign litigants and tribunals in need of judicial assistance than it did to domestic litigants and tribunals. Other changes in domestic law stimulated by the Commission, which were brought to Congress's attention, redressed the imbalance to some extent. 72 The imbalance may not have mattered, however, because both the executive branch and the private sector supported the proposed legislation; 73 moreover, the legislation was not controversial, and it issued from a representative body established by Congress, and advised, as Congress directed, by a distinguished committee of experts.
Whoever deserves credit (or blame) for the 1964 legislation enlarging the powers of our courts and State Department to provide and secure assistance in aid of international litigation, the legislation has affected this country's subsequent efforts to fashion arrangements for international civil litigation satisfactory to us and to other countries.
B. Federal Court Rulemaking

The Original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contained very few special provisions for international civil litigation. 74 This is not surprising, as the great increase in international civil litigation came after World War 11. 7 1 It is also not surprising because a major goal of the 1934 Enabling Act was uniformity among federal district courts. 76 The rulemakers pursued that goal by fashioning rules that were not only uniform in that sense but also trans-substantive, that is, uniformly applicable to every type of civil action in the federal courts. Separate (or different) provisions for international civil litigation would have derogated from this scheme.
The 1963 Amendments.
Those concerned about the inadequacy of our mechanisms for seeking and providing assistance in aid of international civil litigation recognized that some provisions in the Federal Rules on such matters as service were an invitation to disaster for litigants using them abroad, whether immediately or when it came time to enforce a judgment. 7 8 They also recognized that the few provisions in the Rules specifically treating litigation with international aspects failed to capture either the reality of foreign law and practice, or the potential for effective judicial assistance, or both. 79 As we have seen, even before the Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure and its Advisory Committee linked up with the Columbia Project on International Procedure, the Commission had decided, as one of its initial projects, to consider revisions in federal statutes and rules.' Targeted for study in the Commission's First Annual Report were Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4, 28, 29, and 44.81 Once the collaboration with the Columbia Project was established, "it was decided that the staffs of both the Commission and the Columbia Project should undertake on a priority basis a study of desirable changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and in Federal statutes." 2 In connection with that stated priority, the Commission's Second Annual Report noted that a member of the Advisory Committee, Judge Albert Maris, was also chair of the Judicial Conference Committee charged with recommending amendments to the Federal Rules. 83 It also reported that "[a]rrangements for cooperation" ' in our courts with greater flexibility in serving process and taking evidence abroad.
The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 4(i) pointed out that "[s]ervice abroad may be considered by a foreign country to require the performance of judicial, and therefore 'sovereign,' acts within its territory, which that country may conceive to be offensive 'to its policy or contrary to its law." '' 6 It also noted the risk that service in violation of foreign law might render a judgment unenforceable in that country or even lead to sanctions against the process server. 87 The provision itself, however, merely presented an array of alternatives in addition to those available under other sections of Rule 4. A lawyer unfamiliar with the pitfalls of foreign service would thus have needed to be aware of the note in order for the rule usefully to "clarify the provisions governing service upon parties in foreign countries." ' Moreover, according to a 1992 decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, a federal district court was powerless to direct, although presumably it could seek to influence, a litigant to use a particular alternative. By (1) permitting service in violation of foreign law (and, in the view of some countries, of international law),' (2) failing adequately to assist lawyers in making an informed choice among alternatives, and (3) neglecting to empower the courts to require resort to another alternative when that would benefit international relations, Rule 4(i) hardly reflected "due regard for the sensibilities of foreign governments."'" Rather, just as many of the 1964 legislative amendments represented a unilateral grant of judicial assistance in aid of litigation abroad, 92 Rule 4(i) represented a unilateral assertion of power in aid of litigation in the federal courts, affording great flexibility but not requiring deference to foreign law or consideration of the international implications of service. Indeed, although the reporter of the 1963 amendments acknowledged that this country should "show some initiative in the international 'unification' of private law in which we have been notably laggard,, 93 he argued that "it would be quixotic to remit the problem of foreign service to a solution which could be attained, if it is attainable at all, only over a period of many years. ' " 94 He also opined that " [t] It is hoped that, since transmission of the notice and waiver forms is a private nonjudicial act, does not purport to effect service, and is not accompanied by any summons or directive from a court, use of the procedure will not offend foreign sovereignties, even those that have withheld their assent to formal service by mail or have objected to the "service-by-mail" provisions of the former rule. Unless the addressee consents, receipt of the request under the revised rule does not give rise to any obligation to answer the lawsuit, does not provide a basis for default judgment, and does not suspend the statute of limitations in those states where the period continues to run until service. The only adverse consequence to the foreign defendant is one shared by domestic defendants; namely, the potential imposition of costs of service that, if successful in the litigation, it would not otherwise have to bear. However, this shifting of expense would not be proper under the rule if the foreign defendant's refusal to waive service was based upon a policy of its government prohibiting all waivers of service. The Advisory Committee also stressed the "distinct advantages"' 1 8 of waiver for a foreign defendant and attempted to meet the specific objections of the British government by asserting that "there will be little reason for a plaintiff"" to use the waiver mechanism, rather than formal service under the policies prohibited its residents from waiving service of formal judicial process even from its own courts." ' ". It is heartening to see the change in tone that has marked successive versions of the Advisory Committee's attempt to justify the extension of waiver of service to defendants abroad. Such a change is evident in language stressing the advantages that the opportunity for waiver may hold for a foreign defendant. Perhaps more important, the Committee's Note has become more conciliatory, no longer confidently asserting that the proposed Rule should not offend reasonable foreign governments," 1 which was the tone of those responsible for the 1963 amendments.
11 2 Of course, in the meantime the rulemakers had learned how some foreign governments in fact reacted to their proposal." 3 Even more heartening is the last-minute and extraordinary decision of the Standing Committee 4 to reverse itself and to recommend that the Judicial Conference approve an alternative version of Rule 4 that made cost-shifting for refusal to waive service applicable only if the plaintiff and defendant are both located in the United States." 5 The decision was extraordinary because it followed the meeting of the full Committee at which the extension of costshifting to defendants located in foreign countries was approved over dissents, 11 6 and because it was a direct result of a subsequent meeting (in September 1992) of the Chairs of the Advisory and Standing Committees with representatives of the Departments of State and Justice and of the British Embassy. ' The Judicial Conference accepted the revised recommendation,
Id. at 30 (emphasis added)
. Passing what it means for a foreign government to "prohibit" waiver of service, the Advisory Committee would have required that the prohibition extend to all cases, including those that were wholly domestic. The notion seems to have been that a government policy prohibiting only waivers sought in litigation abroad did not count. That is a notion as puzzling as the argument, advanced in connection with the reform proposals of thirty years ago, that treated as specious foreign objections to the unilateral acts of other countries when those same acts were permitted by treaty. See Burbank, supra note 72, at 1486 n.177.
111. The Advisory Committee Note to the proposed amendment to Rule 4 that was submitted to, and returned by, the Supreme Court asserted that " [b] ecause the transmission of the waiver does not purport to effect service except by consent, the transmission of a request for consent sent to a foreign country gives no reasonable offense to foreign sovereignty, even to foreign governments that have withheld their assent to service by mail. whether more than an assertion (or a label) distinguishes a waiver mechanism that requires transmission abroad of a copy of the complaint and an official form from formal service of process. 120. Unfortunately, in revising the note to reflect the deletion of cost-shifting when either the plaintiff or the defendant is not located in the United States, the rulemakers failed to clean up the introductory paragraph to subdivision (d):
Subdivision (d). This text is new, but is substantially derived from the former subdivisions (c) (2) (C) and (D), added to the rule by Congress in 1983. The aims of the provision are to eliminate the costs of service of a summons on many parties and to foster cooperation among adversaries and counsel. 122. See letter from Professor George Rutherglen to Hon. Joseph R. Weis, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, 3 (Aug. 24, 1990) ("Only an attorney could distinguish between receipt of the request for waiver, which has already occurred, and formal service, which is to be waived.") (copy on file with author).
123. "Provided the State of destination does not object, the present Convention shall not interfere with (a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to persons abroad." Hague Service Convention, supra note 2, art. 10(a), 20 U.S.T. at 363, 658 U.N.T.S. at 169. " [W] hether a failure to make a reservation with respect to article 10(a) of the Convention constitutes consent to service by mail is a matter on which U.S. courts are divided." Burbank, supra note 72, at 1486-87 (footnotes omitted).
our State Department's view that, with or without cost-shifting, "[a] United States provision authorizing 'waiver of service' . . . does not conform to formal service of process which was intended by the Hague Service Convention."' 2 4 The rulemakers' notion that plaintiffs will prefer formal service under the Convention to waiver of service "in a foreign country like the United Kingdom"' 25 is wishful thinking. In any event, like the 1963 amendment to Rule 4,126 the waiver option presupposes a high degree of sophistication on the part of plaintiffs' lawyers and leaves the choice to them.
12 7 Given the history and content of critical comments, it might have been prudent to exempt international civil litigation from the waiver mechanism until such time as -the rulemakers could study the results of the survey of foreign governments that the State Department agreed to conduct after the September 1992 meeting. 12 8
The rulemakers' persistence in this matter is unfortunate for reasons other than the likelihood that it will provoke additional controversy. Insistence on the availability of the waiver mechanism for use in foreign countries where it is not permitted is inconsistent with three of the major advances made in the 1993 amendments to Rule 4. One of those advances, bespeaking concern for international cooperation and a willingness to subordinate unilateral assertions of power, reposes in amended Rule 4(f), under which "[s]ervice by methods that would violate foreign law is not generally authorized.' ' 12 9 Another consists in the greater clarity, coherence, and guidance provided by amended Rule 4(f), which replaces a hodge-podge of alternatives seemingly available for service abroad 3°--some of them that were not perhaps available ' and others dangerous to use 3 2 -with an exclusive list of options that should reduce the dangers for unsophisticated litigants and attorneys. The third and related advance lies in drawing attention to the Service Convention and other similar treaties that may apply.1
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The rulemakers' persistence is also unfortunate because, in addition to rejecting foreign protests against the extension of the proposed waiver of service mechanism abroad, they rejected the positions of the Departments of Justice and State, which also opposed the extension. 13 What, then, has motivated the rulemakers to cling to a provision the premises and assumptions of which have been repeatedly questioned and which has been, and may still be, controversial both in foreign countries, including some of our treaty partners, and in that branch of the federal government primarily charged with the conduct of foreign relations? First, there was impatience with the unjustified imposition of cost and delay, problems that may be especially serious in international civil litigation. 141. See id. at 4 ("It seems unlikely that Congress intended to give a benefit to foreign defendants that it would not give to domestic defendants."). In context, this appears to be a reference to the supposed intent of the Senate in consenting to the Service Convention. See also id. at 9-10; infra text accompanying notes 191-95.
142. See April 1992 Minutes, supra note 135, at 5; see also id. at 9 (Rule 26). In an attachment to the letter from the Chair of Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to the Chair of the Standing Committee that identified and discussed criticisms and explained changes made by the Advisory Committee, the matter was put as follows concerning Rule 4:
The Department of Justice, which had expressed no comment when the rule was originally proposed, has subsequently taken the position, essentially echoing concerns of the Department of State, that, to avoid possible offense to other governments, it would be preferable for the rule to restrict the request-for-waiver procedure to defendants located within this country. Standing Committee Proposals, supra note 104, Appendix E, Attachment B, at 1.
prohibited by international agreement as may be directed by the court."' 43 This is a stop-gap measure designed to deal with unusual cases, including cases in which the court determines that service will require a violation of foreign law.'" Although not objectionable on its face, its drafting history reveals, and the Advisory Committee Note confirms, that it reflects flawed premises, including erroneous interpretations of the Service Convention. That same history reveals successive decisions to remit controversial interpretations to the Note.
In an earlier version the amended rule would have permitted a court to direct service "by means not authorized by international agreement or not consistent with the law of a foreign country, if the court finds that internationally agreed means or the law of a foreign country (A) will not provide a lawful means by which service can be effected, or (B) in cases of urgency, will not permit service within the time required by the circumstances."' 45 I criticized that formulation both for lack of candor and for conflict with the Service Convention. 4 6 The rulemakers have sought to make clear that the latest version does not permit violation of an international agreement, 147 but they have also adhered to the view that the Hague Convention authorizes alternate methods of service in circumstances where, fairly interpreted, it does not do so.
According to the Advisory Committee, the "Hague Convention does not specify a time within which a foreign country's Central Authority must effect service, but Article 15 does provide that alternate methods may be used if a Central Authority does not respond within six months.' ' 14 8 Taking that position, the rulemakers cite as one possible occasion for use of alternate methods of service under amended Rule 4(f)(3) "the failure of the foreign country's Central Authority to effect service within the six-month period provided by the Convention.' 14 9
143. 1993 Amendments, supra note 118, 113 S. Ct. at 485 (Rule 4 (f)(3)). Still another controversial provision is not explicitly directed at international civil litigation but would have its major impact there.
Rule 4(k)(2) provides:
If the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, serving a summons or filing a waiver of service is also effective, with respect to claims arising under federal law, to establish personal jurisdiction over the person of any defendant who is not subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction of any state. Article .15 does not "provide that alternate methods may be used if a Central Authority does not respond within six months." The article's only textual reference to "six months" appears in paragraphs enabling contracting states to make a formal declaration that would permit the entry of default judgments in the absence of proof of service under certain conditions. 5° The first of those conditions is that "the document was transmitted by one of the methods provided for in this Convention.'' 1 The second is that "a period of time of not less than six months, considered adequate by the judge in the particular case, has elapsed since the date of the transmission of the document."' 5 2
Nothing in the negotiating history contradicts the language of Article 15 or supports the Advisory Committee's interpretation,' 53 nor do descriptions of the Convention during the ratification process.' 54 The way to deal with difficulties in effecting service under the Hague Convention is through diplomatic channels,' 55 not through unilateral resort to means that it does not 150. Article 15 provides:
Where a writ of summons or an equivalent document had to be transmitted abroad for the purpose of service, under the provisions of the present Convention, and the defendant has not appeared, judgment shall not be given until it is established that-(a) the document was served by a method prescribed by the internal law of the State addressed for the service of documents in domestic actions upon persons who are within its territory, or (b) the document was actually delivered to the defendant or to his residence by another method provided for by this Convention, and that in either of these cases the service or the delivery was effected in sufficient time to enable the defendant to defend.
Each Contracting State shall be free to declare that the judge, notwithstanding the provisions of the first paragraph of this article, may give judgment even if no certificate of service or delivery has been received, if all the following conditions are fulfilled-(a) the document was transmitted by one of the methods provided for in this Convention, (b) a period of time of not less than six months, considered adequate by the judge in the particular case, has elapsed since the date of the transmission of the document, (c) no certificate of any kind has been received, even though every reasonable effort has been made to obtain it through the competent authorities of the State addressed. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraphs the judge may order, in case of urgency, any provisional or protective measures. The Advisory Committee was made aware of the dubiety of these interpretations during the comment period. Unfortunately, one commentator who was attentive to some of the problems" 6° was more interested in ensuring that alternate methods would be available for other situations,' and he was sanguine about occasional violations of the Hague Convention pursuant to a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. 6 2 Other commentators simply asserted that 23 . So for a time were members of the Advisory Committee. When concern was expressed that "the rules propose to authorize service in violation of a treaty ... it was pointed out that some signatories do not obey the the Service Convention authorizes resort to alternate methods if a foreign government is dilatory. 63 Moreover, during the initial comment process, both the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC")' 64 and the Department of Justice 16 1 pressed for greater flexibility in the use of alternate methods of service. When the State Department's views finally were expressed, at first indirectly' 66 and then directly, 67 they were insufficiently specific to prompt deletion from the note of controversial interpretations that had been eliminated from the text of the rule." r The progressive sanitizing of Rule 4(f)(3), by eliminating what might have been construed as permission to violate a treaty and remitting controversial interpretations of the Service Convention to the note, was a course consistent with that advocated by members of the Advisory Committee in connection with the proposal to amend Rule 26:
And another factor that some members of the Committee were concerned about is frankly beyond the ken of this Committee, but important, I suppose, and that is honoring diplomatic efforts that are undertaken and accomplished by other branches of government and not offending the processes that are set up, for example. And, frankly, there's a fundamental tension between those kinds of concerns.
And in one respect, one of the people on the Committee-your proposal is consistent with the view that some members of the Committee had, that we should express-and that may be the adverb word-express deference to processes that have been established through other channels and by other branches of government. After expressing that deference-I don't mean as a complete ritual, but after expressing that deference, then proceed with what we need to do to do justice. Members of the Standing Committee may have felt that, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's actions in returning some of the earlier proposals and requesting a report, 177 something had to go. The differing perspectives of the Justice and State Departments at the end of the process 178 mirrored confusion about the Rule 26 proposal throughout the process. The proposed amendment to Rule 26 was an attempt to discipline discovery abroad with attention to international relations. Appearing at first far-reaching, it was watered down to the point of insignificance. Indeed, the result of the Advisory Committee's volte face was regarded in some quarters as positively harmful to international relations.1 79 In those circumstances, the better part of valor was to preserve the status quo. 29, 1990) , enclosed with letter from Edward R. Alley, Esq., to Hon. Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Chairman, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Sept. 5, 1990) (copies on file with author); State Department Letter, supra note 121 (expressing "great concern" about "discovery in contravention of foreign law or applicable international convention" and arguing that proposed Rule 26(a)(5) "establishes a standard which encourages U.S. parties to demonstrate that discovery methods authorized by a treaty are 'inadequate or inequitable' and thus need not be followed in a given case."); Born, supra note 171, at 92-96.
C. Federal Judge-Made Law
Professor Hazard has reminded us that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not the only source of procedural rules applied by the federal courts." The observation is as true for federal civil litigation having international aspects as it is for litigation that is wholly domestic. Apart from procedural law in statutes, local rules of court, standing orders, and treaties, federal judges have limited power to create procedural law in their decisions.' 8 ' Moreover, both in interpreting existing law that is not created in cases and in filling gaps in it, federal judges can exercise power that differs only in degree from their power to fashion common law.t 82 Some of the rules that federal judges have fashioned or that are the product of interpretation are among the most consequential in international civil litigation, and some of them are associated, rightly or wrongly, with the field of procedure. Thus, federal judge-made law "interpreting" the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment often determines whether a foreign defendant can be subjected to the jurisdiction of a state (or federal) court.' 83 Moreover, federal judge-made law will often determine whether international civil litigation remains in federal court despite an objection of forum non conveniens" or a motion to dismiss grounded in a contractual forum selection clause specifying a foreign forum. 85 And again, federal courts may be called upon to interpret and apply a variety of statutes and rules that regulate, in varying levels of detail, the incidents of international civil litigation. On occasion, that process requires mediation between apparently conflicting norms.' 86 In previous work, I have examined claims that there is, or should be, a discrete field of international civil litigation and that special rules apply in such litigation to problems they share with domestic litigation. Disagreeing with such claims, I have argued that [iut seems more accurate to view international civil litigation as part of a process of cross-fertilization in which (1) doctrine and techniques developed in the context of domestic cases are brought to bear on problems presented in international litigation, and (2) the increasingly international dimensions of litigation in our courts prompt changes in doctrine and techniques, which are then applied in domestic cases." As I have also pointed out, it would be surprising to find many special rules of procedure for international civil litigation in federal courts. A major normative premise of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has been not only that the same rules should apply in all federal courts but that they should apply in all cases in those courts. The same quest for uniformity undergirds federal judge-made procedural law. Substantial controversy now attends the premise of trans-substantive rules, but its hold is strong. 188 Moreover, there are additional reasons why federal lawmakers may not wish to have special rules of procedure for international civil litigation.
See
Some of the 1993 amendments to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure represent a further departure from the norm of trans-substantive procedure-as for instance by substituting an exclusive menu of methods of service abroad in place of a list of optional alternatives. 89 Those proposals cling to the norm, however, in connection with the proposed waiver of service mechanism, and only extraordinary action by the Standing Committee broke the mold for cost-shifting. 19° One reason, I have suggested, for persistence with regard to the waiver mechanism has been the view that foreign litigants should not be treated differently than domestic litigants in the absence of compelling reasons. 191 Different treatment could prompt concern about invidious discrimination against foreign litigants. 192 That, however, is apparently not what has most concerned the rulemakers. Both in connection with the waiver of service mechanism 193 and in their deliberations on Rule 26,194 members of the Advisory Committee expressed fear that differences in the rules would confer an unfair advantage on foreign litigants. Moreover, to the extent that their efforts have intersected with existing law, whether found in legislation or treaties, they have been reluctant to conclude that other U.S. lawmakers would have conferred such advantages. 95 In this, they are echoing attitudes evident in the decisions of the Supreme Court interpreting the Service and Evidence Conventions. Neither the decisions nor the attitudes suggest a bright future for a federal common law of international civil litigation.
If those treaties "the respect due an ordinary federal statute." 198 In Agrospatiale, however, the Court did treat the Evidence Convention like an ordinary federal statute by refusing seriously to engage the Convention's policies out of concern for the integrity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 1 99 One attitude that emerges from the opinions is a determination to preserve as much domestic procedural law as possible, particularly if it reposes in the Federal Rules. Another, related attitude is reluctance to interpret treaties so as to confer greater rights on foreign litigants than their domestic opponents. The latter impulse was so strong in Agrospatiale that it prompted not only speculation about what our treatymakers would or would not have done 2 " but also dubious interpretations of things that they in fact had done. 201 The Supreme Court has, of course, counseled special concern for the interests of foreign litigants and the need for smooth international relations, 2 " 2 and it did so in Agrospatiale. 2°3 In addition, the Court has on occasion expressed an attitude quite the opposite of the preference for domestic law that is evident in the majority opinions in Schlunk and Arospatiale, as well as in the recent work of the rulemakers. 2° Foreign litigants have not, however, reaped many benefits, because rules originally formulated for their benefit have been extended to domestic litigation, 2 5 or because such rules are not worthy of the name. 2°6 Moreover, it is possible that "the Court's schizophrenic approach to treaties is simply a function of calculations about when it is in the judiciary's interest to share power.' It may seem odd to put treaties last among the methods of lawmaking for international civil litigation, at least in an article celebrating the one hundredth anniversary of the Hague Conference on Private International Law. My reasons for doing so derive from a conviction that the historical and institutional contexts in which our limited experience has occurred are essential to understanding and evaluating that experience. In addition, the success of a treaty, particularly in the area of private international law, may depend to a great extent on the processes of domestic lawmaking in which it is given effect.
When the United States joined the Hague Conference in 1964, it took essentially its first steps towards seeking general international agreements in the field of private international law, including procedural law for cases with international aspects. The United States's previous experience was largely with unilateral lawmaking. Moreover, unilateralism is not only an apt description of our procedural lawmaking history prior to 1964. It was also the preferred normative stance of many Americans, whether out of the general belief that foreign entanglements should be avoided or a more focused concern that, in matters of private international law, the federal government lacked the power to, or at least should not, preempt state lawmaking institutions. The adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure marked an important turning point in attitudes towards the proper relationship between federal and state law in the area of procedure and also ultimately had an impact on the movement to seek international cooperation. 2 " At the same time, the Federal Rules have made such cooperation more difficult, in part because the rulemakers and the federal courts cling to the rhetoric, if not the reality, of uniform and trans-substantive procedure, 2 10 and in part because the first consequential treatment of international civil litigation in the Federal Rules occurred just before we joined the Hague Conference.
The 1963 amendments to the Federal Rules 211 and the 1964 amendments to the Judicial Code 212 were double-edged. The legislative amendments in particular were very generous to foreign litigants and tribunals in need of judicial assistance in this country. The rules amendments provided a counterweight, furnishing great flexibility but also asserting power with no requirement of deference to the laws or policies of foreign countries. The hope was expressed that other countries would follow our enlightened example, 2 1 3 and 208. See supra text accompanying notes 1-9.
We maintained an isolationist position in the field of private international law long after we had abandoned this ostrich posture in the public law area. For example, as late as 1958 the United States delegation to the United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, because of the traditional concern regarding federal-state relations, was under instructions not to participate actively in formulating a convention for the recognition of foreign arbitral awards. After the conference adopted-such a convention, the delegation recommended against our adherence thereto on the ground, among others, that the United States lacked a sufficient domestic legal basis for acceptance of an advanced international convention on the subject of arbitration. This always struck me as making us out even more backward than we were. Kearney, supra note 154, at 2 (footnote omitted). For a description of consular agreements, diplomatic notes, and treaties dealing with specialized aspects of judicial assistance, see First Annual Report, supra note 44, at 8-9.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9; Jones, supra note 6, at 561-62. Moreover, assertions that our unilateral act of generosity had been influential in shaping the Service Convention appear to have been designed to persuade senators that international procedure was an area in which we could exercise leadership without surrendering anything of importance. In any event, we did not lead the effort that resulted in the Service Convention; we followed and almost missed the boat.
See supra
The United States joined the Hague Conference only after preparatory work on the treaty had been completed. Our representatives did not participate in the work of the Special Commission that produced the first draft. 220 Our government's observations on that draft and accompanying report were hardly earthshaking; they were chiefly designed to clarify perceived ambiguities. 22 More to the point, a comparison of the Special Commission's draft 222 supra note 154, at 8 (letter of submittal) ("The most significant aspect of the convention is the fact that it requires so little change in the present procedures in the United States, yet at the same time requires such major changes, in the direction of modern.and efficient procedures, in the present practices of many other states."); id. at 1 (letter of transmittal).
217. "It is, I think, a handsome compliment to the Congress of the United States and to the farsightedness of Public Law 88-619 that every basic change in procedure which the convention may require is a change in the direction of our procedure." 1967 SENATE REPORT final treaty' belies the notion that our unilateral efforts "profoundly affected the ultimate text of the convention. ' " 224
The major innovations of the Service Convention were the creation of the Central Authority mechanism (coupled with the obligation of a designated Central Authority to effect service) and the restriction of judgments entered without notice. Both were features of the Special Commission's draft, 22 5 as they are of the final treaty. 226 So too were the obligation of a Central Authority to serve in a special manner requested by the applicant 2 27 and provisions for optional channels of service. 228 Of course, there were changes made in the Special Commission's draft, but the basic structure and most important features of the treaty were in place before the United States entered the game. 229 Recalling the representations made to the Senate, it appears that the major concession that our negotiators obtained was the continued unilateral ability to provide more generous assistance to foreign litigants and tribunals than the treaty required. 23° One thing we gave up, although it is not easy to . But see 1967 SENATE DOCUMENT, supra note 154, at 20 (Report of the U.S. Delegation) ("In order to be sure that U.S. requirements of due process are met ... article 5 of the convention permits the issuing authority to request service in a particular manner... and requires the state addressed to follow that manner unless it is incompatible with its internal law.").
228. Compare ACTES ET DOCUMENTS, supra note 153, at 114 (Draft Article 10) with id. at 348 (Article 10).
229. Mr. Kearney's subsequent description appears more accurate than the representations made to the Senate.
Public Law 88-619 was, however, in a number of respects more liberal in providing judicial assistance than the draft convention, which put the U.S. delegation in the pleasant position of being able to accept the proposed procedure and to concentrate on eliminating restrictions on its use. These efforts were reasonably successful .... Kearney, supra note 154, at 4. He went on to mention two particular features of the Convention, the "freedom of using channels of transmission other than the Central Authority," id. at 4, and "certain substantive provisions having a due process character," id. at 5, that were part of the Special Commission Draft. But see infra text accompanying note 230 (Article 19).
Even Mr. Amram admitted, with respect to "the due process provisions of articles 15 and 16," that "the United States did not suggest their inclusion." 1967 SENATE REPORT, supra note 154, at 14.
230. The letter of submittal indicated that Article 19, inserted at the request of the U.S. delegation, will preserve the full scope of Public Law 88-619. It provides: To the extent that the internal law of a contracting State permits methods of transmission, other than those provided for in the preceding articles, of documents coming from abroad, for service within its territory, the present Convention shall not affect such provisions. This article makes certain that there will be no change internally in the United States in the philosophy, policy, and procedures of Public Law 88-619 and that even though other countries may not offer as much as we do unilaterally, nothing now authorized by this act will be repealed or reduced in the event of ratification of the convention on the part of the United States. 1967 SENATE DOCUMENT, supra note 154, at 5 (letter of submittal). See 1967 SENATE REPORT, supra note 154, at 2. discover from reading the legislative history of the treaty's ratification, was some of the unilateral power asserted in, and in connection with, Federal Rule 4(i). 231 The politics of advice and consent, or simply the egos of those involved, may explain the puffing (and its opposite) that occurred in communications to the Senate about the Service Convention. The primary U.S. negotiator had special reason to want to claim such influence on the Service Convention because, if true, it would vindicate the course taken by the Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure on the advice of the Advisory Committee that he chaired. 2 More than twenty years have passed since the United States ratified the Service Convention, and we are just now seeking to clear up part of the mess that has been spawned in domestic litigation by ignorance of the treaty and uncertainty as to whether and when it is binding. 3 Some of our treaty partners view with concern the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Service Convention in the Schlunk case,' perhaps for the wrong reason. What should most concern our treaty partners is the apparent unwillingness of the Court in Schlunk to resort to the policies of the treaty, as it would a federal statute, to strike down inconsistent state (or federal) law. 235 That bodes ill for the Court's willingness to invalidate the waiver of service mechanism in amended Rule 4(d) as applied to a foreign defendant. More important, the amendment itself bodes ill for our effective participation in international lawmaking. We had trouble admitting at the time that we conceded anything in the Service Convention."
Now we may appear to be trying to eliminate those concessions unilaterally. 2. The Hague Evidence Convention. The United States was playing catch-up at the session of the Hague Conference that adopted the Service Convention, not only because the foundation for that treaty had already been laid without its participation, but also because the whole experience of participating officially in such an endeavor was new. Four years later, when the Conference adopted the Evidence Convention, we could legitimately claim that the initiative had been ours and, indeed, that we had taken the lead in drafting. 38 Moreover, 231 . Although the letter of submittal states that "the provisions of the convention are in conformity with rule 4(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the service of process abroad," 1967 SENATE DOCUMENT, supra note 154, at 3; see id. at 7, elsewhere it notes that "articles 8 and 10 permit a contracting state to narrow the group of permissible channels other than the central authority. 241 In retrospect, ours was not enlightened leadership. The Evidence Convention has been a disappointment to many countries that ratified it and a source of controversy and friction. Intended, as was the Service Convention, to bridge gaps between the civil law and common law systems, the treaty has proved inadequate. A major problem concerns pretrial discovery, in which gaps exist even among common law systems. Some of the signatory states believe that the Evidence Convention is the exclusive means to seek evidence abroad, including through discovery. 242 They were alarmed when, in Agrospatiale, the Supreme Court held that it is not exclusive and, therefore, does not prevent discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 4 3 A prominent observer contends, on the other hand, that the Evidence Convention was not intended to apply to pretrial discovery at all. 2 ways. 2 ' The presentations followed the script, sometimes literally, that had been used successfully to sell the Service Convention. 247 But although in context most of the representations relevant to the exclusivity question concerned, as does Article 27,2 4 only the freedom to provide more generous assistance to others than the Convention requires, 2 4 9 some of the rhetoric is difficult to cabin in that fashion. Thus, both the Senate and the U.S. bar were told that the Evidence Convention "requires no major changes in United States legislation or rules.' ' 0 , Whatever their intended scope, such representations were not likely to induce belief in the exclusivity of the Evidence Convention. Yet, in light of the unilateral steps that the United States had taken in 1964, after Agrospatiale other countries must wonder what benefit they derived from us in the treaty. 2 A number of Special Commissions have considered practice and problems under the Evidence Convention since it came into force. 252 At the first such meeting, there was apparently a consensus that the treaty suffers from bad draftsmanship.
3 That is not the whole story. The misunderstandings and disagreements that have marked interpretations of, and practice under, the Evidence Convention are attributable to inadequate education as much as to bad draftsmanship. It is a commonplace belief 2 4 that treatymaking on matters of private international law, like judicial reform, "is no [B] ut often the quip more accurately describes the time it takes to sell a proposed reform than the time invested in conceiving it.").
256. Kearney, supra note 154, at 8-9. "The speed of this operation is unprecedented in the private law field." Id. at 9.
257. "The actual negotiation of treaties must be preceded by a campaign of reciprocal education by our bar and those of the civil law countries." Jones, supra note 6, at 560. See also Jones, supra note 37, at 96-97.
[Varying perspectives] may even remain unconscious, and creep out of the dark quite unexpectedly after the treaty is born. Differences of view ... on (existing) United States civil proceedings for discovery abroad only appeared after this treaty had been in force for several years; one will find little or nothing in the treaty's history pointing to any awareness of these differences in perspective. A. Unilateralism and National Uniformity For most of our history, federal lawmakers have not provided for the special needs and characteristics of procedure in international civil litigation, either unilaterally or through international agreements. Federal legislation as to matters of procedure in general has been episodic. 265 The authors of the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure made only minor provisions for international civil litigation, 2 " and the federal courts have usually conflated international with domestic litigation in fashioning judge-made procedural law. 267 Finally, until 1964, the United States declined to become involved in international efforts to address conflicts in procedural law.
"
One major factor that helps explain the historic dearth of congressional legislation and absence of treaties on procedure for international civil litigation is concern for the lawmaking prerogatives of the states. To the extent that either the Constitution or domestic politics was thought to prevent federal action, the necessary result was that, from an international perspective, the United States acted (if at all) unilaterally, even if not with one voice.
269
Concerns about the lawmaking prerogatives of the states have not been the only cause of unilateralism in procedural lawmaking for international civil litigation, however. Ours is a history of isolationism and of strong preference for domestic solutions.
27°
The Federal Rules represented a triumph over claims of federalism for the procedural law applied in the federal courts. But the animating goal of uniformity, as implemented by the rulemakers and by the federal courts in judge-made law, militated against special rules for international civil litigation. The centrifugal force of a norm of national uniformity and of legal chauvinism also rendered the pursuit of international uniformity more difficult. 27 1 In the relatively brief span of years since Congress created the Commission and Advisory Committee on International Rules of Judicial Procedure, a 264. See, e.g., Executive Branch Comments, supra note 106, at 3-4. Moreover, the rulemakers proceeded with the amendment to Rule 4 extending the waiver of service mechanism to international civil litigation before the State Department had the opportunity to conduct a survey of foreign government views. dramatic change has occurred in the United States's formal posture towards procedural lawmaking for international civil litigation. There is, however, less there than meets the eye. The Commission's recommendations of unilateral changes in the U.S. rules regarding judicial assistance in 1963 and 1964 were initially a consequence of its own vicissitudes and ultimately reflected the naive view that if the United States were generous, other countries would follow its lead.
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Moreover, that approach was in tension if not conflict with the position already taken by Congress when it established the Commission and set its priorities. 2 7 3 Finally, grants of unilateral assistance were matched with claims of unilateral power. 274 The United States announced at the time that no strings were attached to its generosity. 275 Subsequent events suggest that there is more than one way to attach strings and, more generally, that unilateralism is a hard habit to break.
276
There was little U.S. negotiators could do to affect the structure and major features of the Service Convention, but that did not prevent them from making extravagant claims in seeking Senate consent to the treaty. Their major accomplishment seems to have been the preservation of freedom for countries to offer more generous judicial assistance than required by the Convention. 277 That was also a goal in drafting and negotiating the Evidence Convention. The claims made in selling that treaty were similar in tone and content.
27 8 The domestic message on both occasions seemed to be that the United States can In seeking more money for the Commission in 1965, Senator Morse observed: As valuable as these revisions of our rules and statutes are, they do little to improve the judicial assistance available to litigants in courts of the United States and in our State courts. That can only be achieved by the negotiation of the procedural treaties which the Congress has directed the Commission to draft. In Soci~t6 Nationale, the Court cited lack of reciprocity, but this country waived that objection in 1964 when changes in legislation and the Federal Rules opened the way for foreign litigants to secure evidence in this country freely. As Mr. Amram remarked, that step was taken without any requirement of reciprocity. We should not now be returning to that narrow approach. participate in the international arena without giving up the power to act unilaterally whether in aid of litigation at home or abroad. That is also a message treaty partners of the United States might reasonably take from Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Service and Evidence Conventions. Even if the Court reached the correct treaty interpretations in Schlunk and Agrospatiale, it employed reasoning that could deny to treaties regulating procedure in international civil litigation the power to constrain unilateral action. 279 Thus, in Schlunk the Court said that it was unwilling to believe that "this country, or any other country, will draft its internal laws deliberately so as to circumvent the-Convention." 2 ' 8 'In Arospatiale, the Court manifested more interest in preserving the policies of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure than it did in adjusting domestic law to the policies of a treaty.
281
The recent effort to amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with respect to the needs of international civil litigation is more of the same. The amendments to Rule 4 are said to be animated in part by a desire to give more prominence to, and foster compliance with, the Service Convention and other international agreements regulating service.'
Although they would thus mark an advance, in taking one step forward we are also taking two steps back.
Coming so soon after Schlunk, the extension of the waiver of service mechanism abroad may be viewed by other signatories of the Service Convention as a response to an invitation, rather than as proof that the Court was a poor prophet, regarding the use of internal law to circumvent treaties. In any event, the effect of the amendment will be to recapture unilaterally some of the power that we surrendered in the Service Convention, 28 ' all in the name of national uniformity (in the federal courts). In the case of amended Rule 4 (f)(3) (providing for alternate methods of service upon order of the court), the trade-offs are less obvious, due in large part to the drafting history. The mischief now reposes in the Advisory Committee Note, which advances interpretations of the Service Convention that call into question the genuineness of a professed commitment not to violate treaties. 285 The proposed amendment to Rule 26 is gone, but it may not be soon forgotten. Originally an attempt to adjust domestic law to the policies of the Evidence Convention, the proposal quickly became mired in controversy. It emerged from the first round barely comprehensible, and although eventually 279. See supra text accompanying notes 196-99; see also United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2198 n.4 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It is difficult to see how an interpretation that encourages unilateral action could foster cooperation and mutual assistance-the stated goals of the Treaty.").
280 clarified in the second, might have been thought to claim more unilateral power than it foreswore. 2 6 In sum, unilateral lawmaking was the only course open to the United States until it overcame the federalism and other objections to international cooperation. By that time, however, ingrained chauvinism was buoyed at the federal level by a normative preference for uniform rules. The rhetoric attending the United States's first forays into the world of international procedural lawmaking suggested that it could participate at no, or very little, cost to the established regime. That has been the tendency of U.S. procedural lawmaking, international and domestic, ever since.
Whether or not unilateralism was initially a principled choice of the Commission and Advisory Committee on International Rules of Civil Procedure,' it was the preference of Professor Smit, who became an important contributor to the Commission's work. ' Indeed, it remains his preference today.2 9 That preference is consistent with this country's traditional approach to international relations but is hard to justify, even in purely practical terms, in a world that is increasingly interdependent and in which our economic strength is waning.
Unilateral lawmaking can, of course, lead to international rapprochement, if not international cooperation, as the history of aggressive assertions of legislative jurisdiction to enforce U.S. antitrust law may suggest. 2 ' But if unilateral claims of power are to lead to international accord, they require both the strength to persevere in the face of international objections and an eventual perception on the part of other countries that it is in their best interests to follow suit. Although the first condition may obtain in connection with procedural law for international civil litigation, the second seems remote. Most other countries do not share our views about litigation, 291 and as we ourselves reconsider those views, 2 2 they have even less incentive to emulate us.
Moreover, unilateralism can work in two directions, conferring as well as seeking to appropriate benefits. The problem with unilateral generosity is that it may weaken U.S. bargaining power when, other countries having chosen not to follow our example, it attempts to work out mutually acceptable agree- ments. 293 That looms as a difficulty for the United States in pursuing a multilateral convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
294
Renouncing adherence to the Service and Evidence Conventions, which Professor Smit advocates, 295 would at least be a straightforward way of implementing a strategy of unilateralism. For that reason alone, it would be preferable to 'the rulemakers' present course, 2 9 a course encouraged by Supreme Court decisions that are instinct with a preference for domestic law and, in the case of federal courts, for national over international uniformity. 2 7 Renunciation would also be preferable because it would require decisions by those charged with the responsibility to conduct this country's foreign relations. Because courts and rulemakers have neither mandate nor expertise in that sphere, unilateral judicial lawmaking on matters that obviously and necessarily implicate foreign relations is subject to criticism, whether it would confer or seek to appropriate benefits.
298
Far from renouncing the Service and Evidence Conventions, however, we should work harder with our treaty partners to understand and remove sources of difficulties. That will require a greater commitment of time and resources than we have thus far been willing to devote to the enterprise, and it will also require greater willingness to entertain the notion that the U.S. way is not the only rational way to proceed. 2 ' Equally important, an effort to understand and remove the sources of present difficulties under the Service and Evidence Conventions will require greater institutional coordination among domestic lawmakers. 3 " Such coordination is necessary both to prevent unilateral lawmaking that would compromise international cooperation and to insure that any attempts to reach new understandings-an endeavor that should be a high priority in the case of the Evidence Convention 3°0 -are fully informed.
B. Impatience
The Commission and Advisory Committee on International Rules of Judicial Procedure wanted to accomplish something in the short time originally allotted to their work, and that period was not sufficient to complete the task that Congress set as the first priority: "draft [ing] The Service Convention was no test at all, because we came on the scene so late in its development. Yet, in the domestic process of ratification, "success" was defined according to the extent of unilateral power preserved. 3 0 6 That attitude, the attendant conviction that the United States's system alone is worth emulating, and the short time devoted to drafting and negotiating the Evidence Convention, hindered mutual education and understanding. 3 7 The 1964 legislation may have brought "the United States to the forefront of nations adjusting their procedures to those of sister nations, ''3 ' but the adjustments were unilateral. Having given so much, we were not willing to take the time necessary to understand other legal systems and legal cultures, or to educate representatives thereof about our own.
The impatience of U.S. lawmakers thus had at least two aspects: a desire to push ahead with reforms we deemed appropriate and an unwillingness to come to grips with the underlying assumptions and animating policies of legal arrangements in other countries. Subsequent events have confirmed that the integrity of domestic law, in particular the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is more important to the United States than accommodating the needs of the international legal order. That was one of the messages of the Supreme Court's decision in Arospatiale, 3° and it seems to have been received loud and clear by the lower federal courts, 310 while the rest of the Court's opinion has been relegated to the dustbin of U.S. rhetoric on international cooperation. also a message other countries, including the United States's treaty partners, may take from the recent process to amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 12 The rulemakers are pursuing a vision of domestic justice at the expense of international justice.
C. Penuriousness
The Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure's attempts to secure adequate funding from Congress make for depressing reading. 313 The work that the Commission accomplished resulted primarily from private funding, and, perhaps in part for that reason, the Commission did not follow Congress's stated priorities. Once the United States determined to participate in efforts to reach international agreements in the area of private international law by joining the Hague Conference and other similar organizations, it remained to be seen whether those commitments would be backed up with the resources necessary for effective participation. The record is mixed. It has improved, but there is still progress to be made.
The United States has financial obligations to the Hague Conference and other similar international organizations to which it belongs. Unfortunately, the politics of certain international organizations has in the past caused this country to treat all such organizations monolithically, reducing or delaying our payments. 315 Private international law, including procedure, is not without a political component, but it is far removed from the concerns that caused us to cut back on funding." 6 The United States needs to be more discriminating in the future, mindful that other members are likely to see in the failure to pay our dues a lack of serious commitment to the enterprise.
The drafting and negotiating of treaties requires an infrastructure within domestic institutions. For initiatives in private international law, the Department of State relies on the Office of the Legal Adviser, the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Private International Law, and ad hoc groups of experts. 7 This system, both in formulating the United States's positions and in seeking areas in which developments in enforcement have the most potential because no large country other than the U.S. has so few treaties and yet so much rhetoric about international cooperation. Id. at 384-85.
312. See supra text accompanying notes 123-28.
ratification of concluded treaties, places heavy reliance on the private sector. That emphasis appears to reflect the views that, in matters of private law, the government's role is to seek to implement the preferences of U.S. legal consumers (including government consumers), and that success in securing the consent of the Senate depends on the enthusiasm of, and lack of serious disagreements among, those consumers. 319 Viewing the enterprise as driven by the private sector permits, or at least helps to justify, heavy reliance on private resources to fund the work. 32 In the early years of U.S. involvement in the work of the Hague Conference and other similar organizations, the responsibility for private international law work rested with a designated individual within the State Department's Office of the Legal Adviser. 32 ' Since 1979, there has been a separate Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International Law charged with those responsibilities. That office now has two full-time professionals, an administrative assistant, and occasional student interns. Their responsibilities are varied: monitoring developments under the private international law treaties to which the United States is a party; coordinating attempts to secure ratification of such treaties signed on behalf of the United States; organizing and chairing study groups to consider new treaty initiatives; and participating in international meetings for the purpose of negotiating treaties and discussing experience under treaties already concluded. 322 Both the Secretary's Advisory Committee and its associated study groups are composed primarily (although by no means exclusively) of lawyers and academics from the private sector who participate without compensation and often without reimbursement of expenses. 3 " Funds for meetings both at home and abroad are limited, and it requires careful planning and creativity on the part of the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International Law, as well as generosity on the part of private sector participants, to ensure that the United States is adequately represented. 324 It is no criticism of the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International Law to say that the public support provided for the work of that office is inadequate. On the contrary, the volume and quality of the work accomplished are extraordinary. But there are only twenty-four hours in a day, and, as the United States increases its private international law commitments, 3 25 the setting of priorities will become more painful and the costs of tasks deferred or simply not addressed will become unacceptable. The problem may not be unique to this office, which must compete for resources with other elements of the State Department. The dollars required for one or two more professionals in the office and for adequate participation in domestic and international meetings are, however, a small price to pay when the stakes are this country's effectiveness in an increasingly important field of international lawmaking.
The United States has interests in private international law that transcend, and may even conflict with, the collective preferences of U.S. legal consumers. Federal and state governments devote substantial resources to the establishment and maintenance of court systems. In addition, the resolution of international disputes and the establishment of behavioral norms for international actors is increasingly critical to our economic and social well-being as a nation. There is no bright line between public and private law, 326 a fact that both complicates the work of reaching international agreements on matters of private international law 327 and highlights the importance of adequate public support for the enterprise.
IV
INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The recent history of U.S. involvement in procedural lawmaking for international civil litigation reveals pervasive tension between the desire to honor international agreements and the determination to do justice as we see it. In resolving that tension, we have too often preferred to act rather than discuss, to act unilaterally rather than cooperatively, and to pursue national rather than international uniformity. Professor Smit's proposal that we renounce adherence to the Service and Evidence Conventions is at least forthright. 32 8 Sharing the view that the United States should conduct itself forthrightly in the international arena, I believe that both normative and practical considerations argue for more rather than less international cooperation. If that is correct, there must be a greater commitment of time and resources to the enterprise. More fundamentally, there must be some adjustments in lawmaking structures and techniques.
A. Legislation and Court Rulemaking
The arguments traditionally made in support of the control of procedure by court rules rather than legislation include institutional authority, expertise, and efficiency. 32 9 In recent years, federal court rulemaking has attracted consider-able attention and generated substantial controversy. 3 3° Congress's overhaul of the Enabling Acts 331 has not succeeded in quieting the criticism. 332 In large part, that is due to growing awareness of the political dimensions of procedural reform, 3 33 an awareness fueled by Congress's own forays into the field. 334 When proposed Federal Rules require choices between procedural and substantive policies, including by reason of their anticipated effects, claims for rulemaking founded in the judiciary's institutional authority and expertise are of diminished force, as are claims for trans-substantive procedural law. 335 Moreover, changes in the rulemaking process, 336 assimilating it to the legislative process, have sapped claims of comparative efficiency, and Congress's renascent interest in procedural reform has weakened the argument concerning that body's traditional inertia.
International civil litigation in U.S. courts is sufficiently ubiquitous that, in one sense, every proposed change in domestic procedure has international implications. Very few such proposals, however, necessarily and obviously implicate U.S. foreign relations. The biggest subset is likely to be proposals that deal with matters that are the subject of international agreements. When proposed procedural lawmaking necessarily and obviously implicates U.S. foreign relations, there is no persuasive theoretical or practical argument for court rulemaking in its present form.
Court rulemaking under the Enabling Act does not require or even contemplate congressional approval, and it gives no role at all to the President (except insofar as blocking proposed Federal Rules requires legislation). 337 Moreover, such congressional review as has occurred both of specific proposals and of the rulemaking process has usually been at the initiative of the House of Representatives. 338 In other words, the enterprise is one in which the institutions primarily charged with the conduct of this country's foreign relations play either no role at all or a very minor (and reactive) role. For procedural law of the sort under discussion-necessarily and obviously implicating U.S. foreign relations-the perspective of institutional authority does not support the current process of creating Federal Rules.
. Unlike the Commission and Advisory Committee on International Rules of Judicial Procedure,' the judges (including Justices), academics, and (very few) practicing lawyers who collectively comprise the group I refer to as "the rulemakers" have little experience or expertise in international civil litigation, let alone international law. 341 The Advisory Committee's interpretations of the Service Convention in connection with the 1993 amendments to Rule 4 and the whole Rule 26 fiasco are not reassuring in that regard. 42 The Supreme Court sent back proposals with foreign relations implications, and although some of them became effective as revised, it was not a speedy process.
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The rulemakers are bright, accomplished individuals who can learn what they do not know. Unfortunately, the Advisory Committee made no special effort to learn the views of experts in international relations and international law, including representatives of the State Department, apparently relying on a monolithic view of the government, and thus on the Justice Department, to convey those views. 4 Moreover, when the State Department's views were finally made known, they were for a time dismissed or discounted as reactive or as a change of position.
3 4 " Against this background, the last-minute efforts of the Chairs of the Advisory and Standing Committees, which resulted in an important change in the amendments to Rule 4, are even more impressive, however irregular the procedure. When prudence counsels (or the Enabling Act requires) that federal law be made through legislation rather than court rules, the desire to take advantage of the rulemakers' expertise, to facilitate comprehensive procedural reform, to honor a sense of shared institutional authority, or to overcome traditional congressional inertia, may nonetheless suggest the wisdom of a two-tier process.
service of process abroad. Moreover, many of the considerations he adduces for curbing judicial discretion are equally apt when the question is not whether there should be rules but who should make them and pursuant to what process. 352. Legislation should have been sought for the extension of personal jurisdiction in federal question cases, see supra note 143, and the application of the waiver of service mechanism to international cases. See supra text accompanying note 104. Amended Rule 4(f)(3), supra text accompanying note 143, is not on its face controversial for these purposes. Rather, it is the Advisory Committee Note that may cause problems.
[Vol. 57: No. 3 congressional attention. 3 Those are reasons enough for Congress to require a two-tier process of the strong type when the rulemakers propose Federal Rules that necessarily intersect with an existing treaty. The existence of a treaty is an admittedly imperfect surrogate for a substantial foreign relations interest. But the requirement would at least ensure the active participation of Congress and the President in unilateral domestic lawmaking on matters where we have already made a national commitment to international cooperation. 4 It would also provide an opportunity for Congress to consider whether a particular proposal should apply in state courts, an option not available to the rulemakers.
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Even if the United States adopts a two-tier process of the strong type for rulemaking proposals that necessarily and obviously implicate foreign relations-and especially if we do not-the rulemakers need to put their house in order. It makes no sense to have them proceed through all or most of their deliberations in ignorance of foreign relations considerations (or foreign or international law), leaving to Congress the task of redoing the policy calculus after hearing and taking full account of those concerns.
Changes in the world and in the world of litigation may bring the concerns of international civil litigation to the attention of the rulemakers more often in the future than they have in the past, but they are likely to remain a sidelight. Indeed, some of the problems that plagued the recent effort to amend the Federal Rules may have been due to the heavy load of proposals on the Advisory Committee's plate, many of which were controversial and all of which vied for a finite amount of time for study, reflection, and discussion. 356 The probable distribution of the rulemakers' workload in the future does not justify a major effort to secure relevant international expertise among their number, particularly since there are more pressing issues of representativeness.
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At the same time, however, revising the lists of those notified of proposed Federal Rules will not ensure that such expertise is effectively communicated and considered.
It will help in the future if the rulemakers understand that the executive branch is not a monolith and that differences of opinion are possible within, as well as between, agencies and departments. Such understanding might have prevented members of the Advisory Committee from imputing a change of position or reactiveness to comments the timing of which was in part a function of late notice to the State Department. 35 Separate mailings to concerned departments and agencies can solve the problem of late notice, but they cannot solve the problem the rulemakers face when they confront, as they have recently, conflicting positions. One solution to that problem is to reduce conflicts by requiring executive branch comments on proposed Federal Rules to be coordinated and cleared in a manner similar to comments on proposed legislation. 3 59 But even if the process works for legislation, it is doubtful that it should be extended to an arena in which no ultimate legislative activity is contemplated and thus the risks of muting or submerging one agency's or department's concerns may be unduly high.
Assuming that executive branch agencies and departments will remain free to comment separately on proposed Federal Rules, it is not appropriate for the rulemakers simply to discount criticism because it is not unanimous. It is possible to evaluate comments according to the perspective from which they are made. When, for example, a litigating agency comments on a proposal having international implications, it is fair to assume that it does so with considerable self-interest. The State Department lacks such direct self-interest, and it is above all charged with responsibility for this country's foreign relations. The comments of the State Department reflecting that responsibility deserve far more weight from the rulemakers in the future than they have received in the recent past.
For its part, the State Department should improve its method for formulating and communicating comments on proposed Federal Rules. It cannot safely rely on another department, which may have inconsistent views. 36° Moreover, the Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International Law cannot easily perform the task given its current workload. The Secretary's Advisory Committee on Private International Law is not necessarily well-suited for such a specialized mission. 36 1 It could, however, create a standing study group for the purpose of evaluating proposed Federal Rules and helping the Department prepare comments.
The proposed study group could perform useful services in addition to evaluating proposed Federal Rules. It could monitor experience under existing treaties, federal legislation, Federal Rules, and state provisions that relate to international civil litigation, as well as suggest reforms. In so doing, the group would continue the work of the Commission and Advisory Committee on International Rules of Judicial Procedure. 
B. Treatymaking and Interpretation
The United States has come a long way since joining the Hague Conference in 1964. A well-developed structure is in place for advising the State Department on treaty proposals and for formulating and negotiating U.S. positions on matters of private international law. The United States has emerged from a period when there was concern that the failure to ratify treaties would imperil its effective participation in international lawmaking. 36 2 We are no longer in a rush to conclude treaties, but neither are we paralyzed at the stage of national commitment. More public resources should be devoted to the enterprise, but the basic structure appears sound. Recent experience, however, suggests some steps that may be helpful in the future.
I have argued that the major weakness of the Supreme Court's decisions interpreting the Service and Evidence Conventions reposes not in the Court's treaty interpretations narrowly viewed, but in language that exalts domestic law, particularly the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and suggests an unwillingness to subordinate or adjust such law to the requirements of a treaty. 3 63 I have also argued that, given the domestic ratification histories of those treaties, the Court's posture is understandable but that it has had a baneful effect on subsequent domestic lawmaking initiatives. 3 " Moreover, I have attempted to discriminate between unilateral domestic lawmaking that faithfully and appropriately advances the policies of a treaty and lawmaking that either subverts treaty policies or is an unjustifiable giveaway, both of which undermine our international bargaining position. 365 If, as I believe, the United States will be required to compromise more in the future than it has (or has been willing to acknowledge) in the past when concluding treaties on aspects of procedure in international civil litigation, it is vitally important that the negotiators understand the compromises and fully and accurately describe them in the ratification process.
Just as the federal rulemaking process should more systematically and thoughtfully incorporate the views and perspectives of the State Department, the State Department should insure that its processes, in particular for study groups, require consultation with the rulemakers on matters proposed for international agreement that are addressed in the Federal Rules. 366 Moreover, some similar mechanism should be in place to ensure understanding of the ramifications of possible treaty provisions for state procedural law.
Assuming the negotiators understand the extent to which a treaty signed on behalf of the United States derogates from domestic law, it should be easy for them accurately to describe those matters in the ratification process. There may be reluctance to make full disclosure out of concern that it will generate controversy, which according to traditional wisdom is the death of private international law treaties. 367 Yet, such a strategy has potential costs in addition to the obvious. Courts and other domestic lawmakers have good reason to be reluctant to confer-unilaterally in their view-advantages that the Senate had no reason to think it had conferred. Moreover, an emphasis on the integrity of domestic law in treatymaking renders even modest compromises vulnerable to subsequent unilateral domestic lawmaking. Both phenomena weaken the standing of the United States in the international community.
If the cost of candor in the ratification process is the Senate's unwillingness to give its advice and consent to private international law treaties, the United States may need to rethink its approach to such treaties. Assuming that the United States's interests are more than the sum of the collective preferences of U.S. legal consumers, it should be willing to ratify a treaty, even in the face of domestic opposition, if that treaty represents, on the whole, a net improvement.
V CONCLUSION
It is ironic that, at a time when the premises of U.S. procedure are undergoing reexamination and some of the basic rules are changing, 3 " lawmakers should remain so attached to the integrity of domestic law and its export abroad through international civil litigation. A good part of the explanation lies in the fact of, and the attitudes that shaped, a long history of unilateral lawmaking and the correspondingly short history of international lawmaking in its shadow. Moreover, in the case of federal procedural law, since 1938 the integrity of domestic law has meant uniformity. Seeking to preserve domestic procedural uniformity renders the quest for international uniformity more difficult. Finally, even if isolationism is no longer a national trait, impatience and chauvinism surely are, and will remain so if lawmakers ignore foreign and international law.
If I am correct that we can no longer have our cake and eat it too, institutional changes of the sort I have recommended will not be sufficient to accommodate the new reality. Nor, for that matter, will a greater infusion of time and money to international lawmaking. We must be more willing than we have been to engage other legal systems seriously. Only by doing so will we be able to redefine success in international lawmaking, 3 69 and thereby become members in fact, as well as in name, of the international legal community. VI POSTSCRIPT Shortly before this Symposium issue was to be published, Professor Carrington and Judge Phillips wrote their article on "the interface of treaties and rules of procedure., 3 7 " That, of course, is a subject treated in some detail in my article. 371 In order not further to delay publication, I leave a detailed comparison of our views to interested readers. I now wish to make only three observations. First, I am delighted that Professor Carrington and Judge Phillips agree with me that procedural law necessarily implicating this country's foreign relations should be made by Congress, not the Supreme Court exercising rulemaking power under the Enabling Act. 372 They thus agree with me that, at the least, Congress should have been alerted to the potential ramifications of extending the waiver of service mechanism in amended Rule 4 to those who must be served abroad. 373 Second, contrary to those authors' present recollection, 3 74 the foreign relations implications of the proposed amendments to Rule 4 were the subject both of written comments and of testimony in 1990,
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' before foreign governments made their objections known and before the State Department was aware 372. Compare Phillips & Carrington, supra note 370, at 154 ("It seems to these authors that the place to resolve any conflicts between the Executive's concerns in foreign relations and the courts' concern for even-handed civil justice is in Congress."), with supra text accompanying note 339 ("For procedural law of the sort under discussion-necessarily and obviously implicating U.S. foreign relations-the perspective of institutional authority does not support the current process of creating Federal Rules."), and supra text accompanying notes 347-48.
373. Compare Phillips & Carrington, supra note 370, at 154 ("We regret that [flagging 'any doubtful matters for consideration by Congress'] was not the process followed with respect to the 1993 revision of Rule 4"), and id. at 157-58, with supra text accompanying note 351 ("it is a shame that the Committee did not take a similar approach to other controversial provisions in Rule 4 that necessarily and obviously implicate this country's foreign relations").
374. See Phillips & Carrington, supra note 370, at 157 ("As best we recall, only one objection to the proposed revision of Rule 4 was timely received.").
375. See sources cited supra notes 118, 124 and accompanying text; Burbank, supra note 72, at 1485-89.
Although court rules relating to the manner of service do not normally present problems of validity, there is reason to doubt whether the Supreme Court has the power to act as if it were the Congress, and to bypass presidential assent, where service of process implicates the foreign trade or foreign policy interests of the United States ....
[N]ot only has this country entered into two international service conventions since 1963, but events in the intervening years have demonstrated the sensitivity of service on foreign nationals. Letter from Stephen B. Burbank to Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 1-2 (Mar. 14, 1990) (copy on file with author). of the proposal. 376 In that regard, these recent rulemakers are true to form in acting as if the executive branch were a monolith. 3 77 Third, Professor Carrington and Judge Phillips regard the waiver of service issue as a "tempest ... in a teapot ' , 3 78 because of the Supreme Court's decision in Schlunk. 379 For me, the argument only confirms that Schlunk has had a baneful effect on procedural lawmaking for international cases.
3°I
ndeed, taken together with the authors' proposal for a federal statute generalizing the result in Schlunk, 3 81 the argument suggests how far domestic lawmakers may go in unilaterally cancelling the concessions made in a treaty.
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